Since the 1990s, Beijing has consistently rebuffed Washington’s invitations to participate in nuclear arms control negotiations, choosing instead to expand and modernize its nuclear arsenal. China’s estimated 500 nuclear warheads are projected to double by 2030. This unchecked growth, coupled with North Korea’s nuclear advancements, has significantly destabilized the region. Despite U.S. security assurances, a majority of South Koreans now favor their country developing its own nuclear weapons, and Japan’s long-standing aversion to nuclear arms is also waning, setting the stage for a potential arms race in Asia.
To address these developments, Washington must engage in tough, even coercive diplomacy with Beijing. In February, Beijing extended an invitation to the world’s nuclear states to negotiate a “no first use” treaty. The United States, which maintains a first-use option and possesses a significantly larger nuclear arsenal, should seize this opportunity to press for broader arms control agreements. If Beijing negotiates in good faith, it could lead to substantive reductions in nuclear arsenals and enhanced global security.
Should Beijing refuse to participate meaningfully, Washington must be prepared to escalate its own nuclear capabilities and consider nuclear-sharing arrangements with allies like South Korea and Japan. This approach is not without precedent; in 1983, the deployment of nuclear-tipped Pershing II missiles in Europe compelled Moscow to engage in arms control diplomacy, leading to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Today, Washington should bolster its missile defenses, increase the deployment of nuclear-armed submarines and nuclear-capable bombers, and pursue nuclear-sharing agreements with Seoul and Tokyo. Such measures could incentivize China to negotiate by demonstrating that continued nuclear expansion will lead to a greater nuclear threat in its own backyard. This strategy would also require the backing of South Korea and Japan, where public opinion is increasingly in favor of stronger nuclear deterrence.
In South Korea, more than 70 percent of the population supports developing a national nuclear arsenal, and a significant portion of the elite is open to nuclear-sharing arrangements with the United States. Similarly, in Japan, there is a growing willingness to reconsider nuclear options. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other leaders have advocated for a NATO-style nuclear-sharing agreement, and public support for such discussions is rising.
The history of arms control underscores the effectiveness of coercive policies in bringing states to the negotiating table. For example, during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) from 1969 to 1972, the United States leveraged the potential deployment of additional warheads to keep the Soviets engaged in negotiations. More recently, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative pushed the Soviets towards summits aimed at arms control.
To implement a coercive strategy today, Washington should clearly communicate the consequences of China’s continued nuclear expansion to Beijing. This includes the potential for a nuclear Japan and South Korea, which would significantly increase the risk of miscalculation and nuclear accidents. By presenting a stark choice, the U.S. can pressure China into serious arms control negotiations.
The potential for dystopian nuclear futures has historically motivated leaders to pursue arms control. President Reagan’s interest in arms control was partly influenced by the film “The Day After,” which depicted a nuclear holocaust. Similarly, envisioning the severe security costs for Beijing may prompt Chinese leaders to engage in serious discussions.
Exploring Future Scenarios
When wargaming potential scenarios, the United States must consider several future developments. One possible scenario involves a continued arms buildup by China, leading to a regional arms race. In this scenario, U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea may feel compelled to develop their own nuclear arsenals, significantly raising the stakes for regional security and increasing the risk of nuclear conflict.
Another potential scenario is China’s refusal to engage in arms control talks, prompting the U.S. to escalate its nuclear presence in the region. This could involve the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea and the establishment of nuclear-sharing arrangements similar to those in Europe. While this may enhance deterrence, it also risks escalating tensions and prompting a similar response from China.
A more optimistic scenario involves successful coercive diplomacy, where China’s fear of a regional nuclear arms race compels it to enter into serious arms control negotiations. This could lead to a broader arms control agreement that includes transparency measures and limits on nuclear arsenals. Such an agreement would enhance regional stability and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.
If Beijing continues to expand its nuclear forces, Washington must consider leveraging nuclear-sharing arrangements with its Asian allies. This could create a more credible and balanced deterrent in the region. By emphasizing the potential consequences of China’s nuclear ambitions, the U.S. can create a sense of urgency for Beijing to negotiate.
Should Beijing agree to talks, it must demonstrate good faith by allowing greater transparency into its nuclear arsenal, posture, and plans. This could pave the way for broader agreements involving other nuclear states, including Russia, France, and the United Kingdom.
Washington’s ultimate goal should be to transform the competition with China into a collaborative effort to support nonproliferation. While there is no guarantee of success, initiating a new U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogue could protect East Asia from further nuclear proliferation and enhance global security.
